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Introduction 
In June 2015, the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of China’s Communist Party (CCP), 
reported that its Facebook page had received more ‘Likes’ than the Washington Post and the 
Wall Street Journal (People’s Daily, 2015). By the beginning of 2016, its ‘fan base’ had surged 
to 17 million and the paper ranked among the top ten most popular print media on the platform.i 
While the Chinese government has been relatively successful in blocking access to popular 
social networking sites like Facebook or Twitter inside its borders (Yang, 2009), outside, these 
are becoming important tools in the development of an incipient digital public diplomacy 
strategy. Africa and North America have been, for different strategic reasons, the top two 
priority areas in China’s recent efforts to modernize its public diplomacy: China Central 
Television (CCTV) opened its first overseas production and broadcasting centres in Washington 
and Nairobi in 2012; China’s flagship English-language newspaper, China Daily, curates 
specific editions for North America and Africa, and several state actors have launched 
initiatives to be more prominent on social media in both regions. China’s digital public 
diplomacy might be just emerging, but taking into account the speed at which it is developing, it 
is rapidly becoming a subject worthy of academic attention. 
 
Public diplomacy is defined as a nation state’s attempt to influence the opinions and attitudes of 
foreign publics (Heller & Persson, 2009). Throughout history, countries have tried to achieve 
these goals with different tools: from international broadcasting and cultural diplomacy to 
 global advocacy and people-to-people exchanges. The advent of the Internet not only offers an 
entire new platform for implementing these activities, but it also opens new possibilities for a 
more direct engagement with audiences. Cowan and Arsenault (2008) have described this shift 
as moving from monologue to dialogue. Traditionally, states engaged in unilateral and 
unidirectional communication with foreign audiences (monologue), but in recent years, more 
countries have adopted a multidirectional communication approach, allowing audiences to talk 
back (dialogue), sometimes online, sometimes offline. The Chinese government has little 
experience in dialogue-based approaches and only recently has it begun testing these online. In 
many ways, Chinese authorities see Africa as a testing ground: a favourable environment in 
which to roll out new diplomatic initiatives, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) or Nairobi-based CCTV-Africa. While most African countries lag behind other parts 
of the world in landline connectivity, mobile access is booming, particularly in urban contexts, 
leaving ample room for growth of online-based public diplomacy activities. In a globalized 
world characterised by a media industry that is drifting away from the physical borders of 
nation-states, establishing the boundaries of China’s digital diplomacy towards Africa, or those 
of any other region, is not a clear-cut task. However, as this chapter tries to show, China’s 
public diplomacy provides examples of content and strategies that specifically have African 
audiences in mind.  
 
This chapter looks at three aspects of China’s online public diplomacy towards Africa. First, it 
offers a description of its structure and a discussion on how the four major actors involved 
(State agencies, diplomatic missions, State-owned media and other media) interact and operate 
online. Second, by combining social media analytics and data from in-depth interviews it 
provides insights into the target (and real) audience of China’s online public diplomacy. Third, 
it includes a quantitative description of Twitter and YouTube content that helps understand 
what messages are being conveyed online. The evidence presented here suggests that, being a 
novice player, China does not yet excel at these new forms of engaging foreign publics. Based 
on these findings, in the last section of the chapter, I argue that online and offline, Chinese 
 public diplomacy fails in at least six dimensions: overall strategy, cohesive narrative, real 
dialogue, control and supervision, capacity and resources, and depth. 
 
China’s public diplomacy strategies 
Despite China’s relatively low profile in world politics during the Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping eras, the country kept an active public diplomacy portfolio, sometimes with 
conventional practices and sometimes in more unconventional ways. For most of the 1960s and 
1970s, Chinese artist troupes and representatives of the CCP travelled the world or, at least, to 
countries with left-leaning governments (Ratliff, 1969). Throughout those years and well into 
the 1990s, Chinese radio programming and magazines, such as the Peking Review, were seen as 
an important way to engage foreign audiences (Üngör, 2009). Alongside cultural and exchange 
diplomacy, over the last three decades, China has practiced so-called ‘ping pong diplomacy’, 
which paved the way for Henry Kissinger’s historic visit to Beijing and, eventually, the 
reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China (Hong & Sun, 
2000); ‘panda diplomacy’ or the lending of panda bears to amicable countries (Hartig, 2013); 
and, Olympic and Expo diplomacy, events that have a long history of being highly successful 
foreign policy instruments (Huang & Fahmy, 2011; Svensson, 2013). Conventional or 
unconventional, successful or not, all of the above share a common goal: reshaping the 
perception of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) outside its borders, a major foreign policy 
objective for the Chinese leadership since the fourth generation of leaders took office in 2002.  
 
As China’s military and economic power has grown over the last two decades, its leaders have 
become increasingly concerned with the way the world perceives the country. According to 
Wang (2011), the rapid prominence that China has gained internationally since the reform and 
opening up period has created three fractures in the way the country is seen abroad. There is a 
gap between the way China sees itself and the way the rest of the world sees China; there is a 
split between perceptions of Chinese culture and perceptions of Chinese politics; and, finally, 
 there is a mismatch between the way most Western nations perceive China (mostly negatively) 
and how China sees these countries (mostly positively). Since 2007, the idea that China needs to 
build up its soft power, the power to shape the preferences of others by means of attraction and 
appeal (Nye, 2008b), has been fully incorporated into policy documents. It was precisely in 
2007 that Chinese President Hu Jintao told the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party: ‘enhancing cultural soft power is a basic requirement for realizing scientific 
development and social harmony. It is necessary for satisfying rising demands for spiritual 
culture and national development strategy’ (Xinhua, 2007). Public diplomacy is one of the most 
important tools available to nation-states to increase their soft power (Nye, 2008a). Currently, 
China’s public diplomacy is based on four principles: pragmatism, particularism, traditionalism 
and continuity. Its current policies are an extension of a long history of public diplomacy — 
even if it did not go by that name most of the time. It is traditional and particular, in that it still 
employs practices that are considered out-dated by many countries, and it infuses new practices 
with “Chinese characteristics” making them distinctive. Finally, it is pragmatic as it adapts to 
local contexts and circumstances even if this requires sacrifices in the promotion of certain 
values, norms and ideas. Ideology might have been pivotal in China’s engagement with the 
outside world from the 1950s to 1980s, but it is no longer so.  
 
An often-remarked shortcoming in China’s public diplomacy activities is the dispersion of 
practitioners and policy-makers across ministries, offices and bureaus. Nowadays, the planning 
and implementation of China’s public diplomacy activities is handled by three political bodies 
(D’Hooghe, 2011).ii The State Council Information Office and the CCP’s Office of External 
Publicity are at the forefront of policy development. While the former is a government body 
under the direct supervision of the Premier’s office, the latter is under the auspices of the Party. 
In this, as in many other cases in China’s political decision-making, the boundaries between the 
Party and the State are blurred. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), responsible for 
China’s overseas diplomatic missions, is mostly in charge of policy implementation. Within the 
MoFA there is a Public Diplomacy Office (Gonggong Waijiao), which is nested under the 
 Information Department (Xinwen Si). Among the activities that fall under the responsibility of 
the MoFA are advocacy campaigns, such as the holding of press conferences; some parts of 
exchange diplomacy, including the training of foreign diplomats and public information 
officers; and, a limited number of listening activities. Other ministries involved include the 
Ministry of Culture, responsible for the promotion of Chinese culture overseas, and the Ministry 
of Education, which oversees the work of the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as 
a Foreign Language, popularly known as Hanban, that runs the Confucius Institutes. The 
international broadcasting component, including CCTV’s activities, is supervised by the State 
Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), which is under 
direct control of the State Council. The Xinhua News Agency, which also plays an important 
role in international broadcasting, listening and advocacy strategies, is directly under control of 
the State Council.  
 
Some of these agencies went digital at an early stage, particularly in advocacy campaigns. In 
2000, the State Council Information Office launched the China Internet Information Centre 
(www.china.org.cn), a multilingual web portal offering information about China that covers 
everything from Chinese language learning and ethnic minorities to sports, investment 
opportunities and political statements. China.org.cn is a good example the monologic nature of 
the PRC’s core outreach strategies, both online and offline. In China.org.cn, as in other similar 
websites maintained by central, provincial and municipal agencies, content comes from state-
owned media such as Xinhua or CCTV and the objective seems to be conveying as much 
officially-sanctioned information as possible, without much attention being paid to whether it 
resonates with audiences or not. Online, Chinese agencies engage in an information overflow, 
with Xinhua and CCTV at the vanguard. The news agency is online since 2000, and CCTV 
created an online division in 2009, CNTV, operating independently from other CCTV bureaus 
and departments. It handles the multilingual domain www.cntv.cn, functioning as a massive 
database of CCTV content, a large part of which is aimed at non-Chinese speaking audiences.  
 
 Dialogue and collaboration, which characterize online public diplomacy, only occur 
sporadically. Arguably, China’s most successful online campaign to date, at least in terms of 
publicity, given how difficult it is to quantify the actual audience impact, was implemented in 
late October 2015 when CCP leaders began discussing the 13th Five-Year Plan. Xinhua, in 
collaboration with a Shanghai production company, created a short animated video with a 
catchy English song to explain the main contents of the plan titled “Pay Attention to the  
(shi san wu),” in reference to the Chinese name of the Plan: Shisanwu guihua.iii The video was 
uploaded on the vide-sharing platform YouTube, widely circulated on social media and featured 
in international media (see, for example, Horton, 2015; Plucinska, 2015). Leaving this video 
aside, the use of non-Chinese social media, such as Twitter, YouTube or Facebook (all of which 
are banned inside China) remains limited. Some state-owned media have become active online 
but other actors, such as diplomatic missions, have been slow to take up these tools. By the end 
of 2015, the only Chinese embassies/missions with active Twitter or Facebook accounts were 
the ones in Yangon (opened in October 2011), Brussels (September 2013), Geneva (September 
2013), Tokyo (April 2014), Ottawa (August 2014), Pretoria (February 2015), United Nations 
(April 2015), London (June 2015), Prague (July 2015) and Ankara (November 2015).  
 
China’s public diplomacy towards Africa 
Shortly after taking office in 2013, President Xi Jinping embarked on his first trip overseas, 
which included three African nations (Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo) and 
Russia. In diplomacy, no small detail is trivial, and so Xi’s visit to Africa was full of 
significance: Sino-African relations (as much as Sino-Russian relations) are a priority for the 
current leadership. It could be argued that they have been important for decades, all the way 
back to Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds Theory, Zhou Enlai’s 1963 visit to Africa and the 
formulation of the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid (Yu, 1968). However, as Alden (2007) and 
Taylor (2010) argue, China’s renewed engagement with Africa has taken new dimensions. The 
African continent is a priority for China, not only because of trade, but also because it provides 
 political legitimacy, is full of affine governments and offers fertile ground for cultivating new 
relationships that transcend the somewhat confrontational, not necessarily belligerent, nature of 
China’s relations with other parts of the world. The health of Sino-African relations is routinely 
checked at FOCAC, where African countries and China seemingly agree on everything in order 
to take their relationship to new levels. However, outside views are more often than not mired in 
suspicion about China’s ultimate goals and intentions (Cardenal & Araújo, 2013). 
Misconceptions and lies, most of which have been empirically refuted by scholars, abound: 
China does not send prisoners to work in Africa (Hairong & Sautman, 2012); China is not 
buying parts of Africa to feed its own population (Brautigam, 2015) and China is not only 
investing in Africa’s natural resources (Brautigam, 2009). These rumours are not only found in 
the media, but many have also sunk in deep among Africans. Faced with yet another image 
problem, Chinese authorities have made it a priority to offer their own take on Sino-African 
relations through a multifaceted public diplomacy effort.iv 
 
The most visible of China’s outreach projects in Africa are those involving the mass media. 
China has widened its footprint in the African mediasphere since the mid-2000s when a 
trilingual FM radio station in Kenya, the first of its kind in the continent, was launched. Since 
then, Xinhua has increased the number of foreign bureaus in the continent to more than twenty; 
the English-language newspaper China Daily has launched a weekly African edition; 
Chinafrica, a bilingual current affairs magazine, has opened an office in Johannesburg; and, in 
2012, CCTV established its first overseas production centre (CCTV-Africa) in Nairobi. The role 
of these organizations in China’s public diplomacy is crucial. Not only are they a vehicle for 
propagating a Chinese narrative, but their content is also circulated elsewhere. For example, 
some national broadcasters in Africa, such as Kenya’s Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), have 
agreed to relay CCTV-Africa’s content instead of that of other international broadcasters, used 
in the past. Through international broadcasting, be it radio or television, China engages foreign 
audiences in at least two ways: it offers a Chinese perspective on current affairs and it 
showcases China’s cultural productions.  
  
Cultural diplomacy is another important facet. As of early 2016, Africa was home to 46 
Confucius Institutes (CI) and 23 Confucius Classrooms (CC) in 36 countries. CIs are Chinese 
language learning centres and the first contact with Chinese culture for many. They are set up as 
partnerships between African universities, Hanban and Chinese universities, which supply 
personnel and resources. Both Hanban and the Ministry of Education also offer scholarships to 
African students to pursue their studies in China. In the 2015 FOCAC Action Plan, China 
pledged 30,000 government scholarships for university students and offered to train 200,000 
African vocational and technical personnel (FOCAC, 2015). These exchange opportunities 
coexist with others targeting specific groups such as media professionals. On the cultural front, 
Africa is home to five China Cultural Centres (CCC) in Benin, Mauritius, Tanzania, Nigeria and 
Egypt. Agreements have also been reached to open centres in Tunisia and Morocco. The CCCs 
in Benin and Mauritius date back to 1988 and were the first to open in the world. Managed by 
the Bureau for External Cultural Relations in the Ministry of Culture, they are in charge of 
promoting (a specific set of) Chinese cultural expressions overseas. Also in the cultural domain, 
since 2012, several Chinese television dramas have been dubbed into African languages and 
broadcast in different countries, from Tanzania to Senegal and Egypt.  
 
The intensity and breadth of China’s outreach activities in Africa make the continent the perfect 
case study. In many ways, Africa is China’s sandbox when it comes to public diplomacy. China 
feels at ease in Africa, it has found a politically welcoming environment; it has avoided the kind 
of controversies with civil society that it has faced in the past in places like the United States, 
Australia or France; it is able to match the narrative of win-win relations at the core of China’s 
foreign policy jargon with real actions; and, more importantly, it has been able to experiment 
with new forms of outreach and engagement. Africa is the place of many ‘first times’ in China’s 
public diplomacy: the first Cultural Centre, the first FM radio station, the first overseas 
broadcasting centre... When it comes to digital outreach activities, China is barely taking its first 
steps, but Africa offers enormous room for growth. According to the World Bank, the average 
 Internet penetration rate in the continent stood at just over 28 per cent in 2015, way below the 
world average of 49.7 per cent. The speed at which the online population in Africa is growing, 
however, surpasses most countries. Africans are increasingly going online on their mobile 
phones, particularly in urban settings.  
 
As an emerging phenomenon, no comprehensive study on China’s digital public diplomacy has 
been published to date. In this exploratory study, I address four questions related to China’s 
digital outreach activities towards Africa: how is it structured, who is the audience, which goals 
are being pursued and, which messages prevail? Most of the data used here refers specifically to 
CCTV-Africa. There are three reasons for this: it is the single most active agent in digital 
outreach activities, there is abundant data available and, given the dispersion of actors in 
China’s online public diplomacy, it would be otherwise unfeasible to study the practices of each 
and every one of them. This chapter employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. I use 
publicly available information to outline the structure of China’s online public diplomacy 
towards Africa. This is complemented with information from half a dozen semi-structured in-
depth interviews with CCTV-Africa’s staff. Interviews were conducted between March and 
November 2015 in different locations in Nairobi. Finally, I use quantitative data in the analysis 
of messages and audiences. I collected data from CCTV-Africa’s Twitter and YouTube 
accounts and gathered data about audiences using Socialbakers.com, an online marketing tool to 
track and analyse social media platforms.  
 
Structure and actors 
Individuals and private organizations aside, actors involved in China’s online public diplomacy 
can be grouped into four categories: diplomatic missions, state agencies, state-owned media and 
small media organizations. Some of their online activities towards Africa are summarized in 
Table 1. Given the fact that MoFA is responsible for implementing most of China’s public 
diplomacy programmes, one might expect that diplomatic missions would be at the forefront of 
 digital outreach campaigns. However, this is by no means the case in Africa. China has 
established diplomatic relations with 51 African states and currently maintains embassies in 49 
of them, all of which keep active websites, although some are poorly updated, include broken 
links, or provide information that is out-of-date. These websites, carrying mostly MoFA 
statements, news about the activities of the embassy and some content from the media, are the 
most basic form of online public diplomacy. Most pages are bilingual (Chinese and another 
language), although African languages are rarely employed. All websites include a section with 
four to fifteen small banners linking to external pages that deal with critical issues in China’s 
foreign policy. Each embassy decides the banners that appear on their website. The most 
frequently found banners are China.org.cn (on 33 websites), the information portal of the State 
Council Information Office; Tianshan.com.cn (36), a news portal about Xinjiang; 
Showchina.com (27), a website about Tibet; CRI Online (34) and Tibet.cn (21). The only link to 
a page with relevant information about Sino-African relations, the FOCAC website, appears on 
25 embassy websites. Some of the embassies also offer information about Taiwan or the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands; topics on which China has been struggling to impose its own narrative. 
Online, advocacy is the sole form of public diplomacy in which embassies engage. The mission 
in Pretoria is alone in having a Facebook page allowing users to comment on posts. However, 
by the end of 2015, none of the public comments had received a reply from the embassy. 
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Chinese State agencies and small media companies’ engagement with African audiences is 
indirect, either though the websites of diplomatic missions or central media. Nonetheless, their 
presence online is significant and usually goes unnoticed. Links to websites with information 
about Xinjiang (www.chinaxinjiang.cn; www.ts.cn) or Tibet (www.showchina.org; 
www.tibet.cn), two Autonomous Regions in West China that have seen restive movements for 
increased independence from Beijing, feature prominently on the homepages of embassies in 
Africa. These websites copy the design of news portals, provide information that is aligned with 
 the official policy of the PRC and tend to disguise ownership and authorship, which most of the 
time is linked to State agencies. For example, China Intercontinental Press (Wuzhou Chuanbo 
Chubanshe), a Beijing-based company created in 1993 under the supervision of the State 
Council Information Office to produce content for foreign publicity, runs Showchina.org. Two 
embassies (Addis Ababa and Lusaka) also provide links to Facts.org.cn, an English-language 
page providing very critical information about Falun Gong, a religious group banned in China. 
Although the website is presented as being manned by a private citizen, it appears to have the 
backing of Office 610, a paralegal security agency responsible for the prosecution of Falun 
Gong.  
 
The most active agents in China’s online public diplomacy are, by far, the three largest central 
state media: Xinhua, China Radio International (CRI) and CCTV. They all have regularly-
updated websites about Africa, they are active on social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
YouTube and Google+) and all of them use digital channels to distribute content for free. While 
international broadcasters have long targeted African audiences, radio and television access has 
been uneven across the continent. Radio content in languages such as Amharic, Kiswahili, 
Hausa, Kirundi, Kinyarwanda, Ndebele or Somali is available today from VOA, BBC, CRI or 
RFI, but signals reach limited areas. Now, online, users can access content 24/7 everywhere. 
Apart from offering news and commentary online, Chinese international broadcasters are also 
involved, minimally, in listening activities, with CRI having considerable experience in this 
area. Until the mid-1970s, the station collected letters from its Hausa and Swahili listeners. 
According to Üngör (2009), in 1976 alone, CRI received over 6,000 letters in Hausa. Today, 
feedback takes place online. As of early 2016, CRI’s Hausa Facebook page had close to 60,000 
likes and a good number of comments. CRI and Xinhua also have Swahili Facebook pages. 
Taking a step further into localizing content, in 2015, Xinhua began creating video news in 
Swahili, originally produced for Kenya’s KBC and later posted on Xinhua’s YouTube channel.v 
 
 CCTV-Africa’s online presence is managed from Kenya and China. In mid-2013, a year into the 
launch of the station, a consultant was hired in Kenya to put together a digital media team in the 
Nairobi newsroom staffed with half a dozen people, whose duties include updating social media 
platforms, producing content for CCTV-Africa’s website (www.cctv-africa.com) and editing 
and uploading videos on the station’s YouTube channel. According to a member of the team, 
the idea of improving CCTV-Africa’s online presence did not come from the headquarters in 
Beijing, but it was a decision of the management team in Nairobi: ‘CCTV-Africa had been 
around for some time and they knew [that] to reach African audiences, they had to do it 
digitally.’ vi After the departure of the consultant from the newsroom, a Chinese supervisor, with 
no prior training in digital journalism, took over. The online branch of CCTV, called CNTV and 
based in Beijing, is also responsible for posting Africa-related content on the English and 
French-language versions of the website. CNTV is also in charge of the “I Love Africa” 
multimedia platform launched in 2012. The platform works as an aggregator of content (travel 
shows, Chinese television dramas, Chinese language learning courses and documentaries) 
tailored to Africans living in China and abroad. “I Love Africa” has a mobile app and a 
relatively popular Facebook page (1,867,739 likes by January 2016).  
 
Audiences and impact 
Assessing the impact of all the activities detailed above is not only beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but it also surpasses the audience research tools available to Chinese public diplomacy 
practitioners. When asked about audience data, a member of the management team at CCTV-
Africa conceded that no information is available to themvii and a CCTV-Africa producer 
referred to YouTube views when asked about how well local audiences had received a 
particular show.viii Because most of China’s outreach actions in African countries are aimed at 
the long-term, a proper assessment of the impact will only be able to be carried out several years 
from now. However, even at this stage of development, there are, at least, two valid questions to 
pose: how many people are these digital strategies reaching and how does Chinese digital 
 diplomacy do compared to that of other countries? With this in mind, in this section I present 
some data that is available to Chinese public diplomacy practitioners. Second, because it is 
necessary to assess the short-term impact of China’s outreach activities in a comparative 
perspective, I explore how Chinese digital platforms fare when compared to other similar actors. 
For this, I make use of data compiled by Socialbakers for three social networks, Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter. The focus of this section and the next is on CCTV-Africa. Even if data 
cannot be generalized to all of China’s activities in Africa, it does give us a first glimpse into 
the current impact of state-sponsored public diplomacy in the continent. 
 
Upon request, CCTV-Africa provided the author a summary of Facebook analytics, which are 
not publicly available, for a week (January 6 to January 12, 2016). Out of 588,034 users who 
had liked the page by that week, 78 per cent were men and 22 per cent, women. The number of 
users who actually engaged with the page over the same period of time stood at 414,536. 
Followers came mostly from Nigeria (13.3 per cent), Egypt (9.7), Ethiopia (7.5), Tanzania (6.6) 
and Kenya (5.5). These countries altogether account for 42 per cent of the total likes in the page. 
When complementing this data with that available from Socialbakers, we see that there are 28 
African countries among the top 45 countries where followers are located.ix Based on this, 
CCTV-Africa’s Facebook penetration rate in Nigeria can be said to stand at 0.5 per mil of the 
population. Of all the countries in the list, the largest penetration rates are found in Tunisia (3.2 
per mil) and Libya (1.6 per mil), with an average of 0.66 per mil for all 28 countries. In the case 
of BBC Africa’s Facebook page, the average penetration rate is 2.4 per mil (based on 23 
African countries), with Zambia, a former British colony, having the highest rate at 6.3 per mil. 
Data provided by CCTV-Africa also included information about the most popular posts and 
videos. Over that one week-period, the favourite topics included soccer, South Sudanese 
politics, the building of a new marina in Kenya and one of the African proverbs that CCTV-
Africa publishes every morning on social media: ‘Love has to be shown by deeds not words.’ 
 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
  
Today, CCTV-Africa and other Chinese media in the continent need to compete with a myriad 
of news providers. Since CCTV launched CCTV-Africa in 2012, the BBC has increased its 
news coverage of Africa, Al Jazeera has expanded its bureau in Nairobi and a new 24-hour 
news channel about Africa, Africanews, was created in 2016. Most content from these 
broadcasters is also available online and, particularly, on social media platforms. Apart from 
CCTV and Xinhua, other international broadcasters with a strong online presence in African 
countries include the BBC, Deutsche Welle and RFI. In Table 2, I present a comparison of 
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube audience data for a selection of these media outlets at two 
points in time, October 2015 and March 2016. The most evident pattern across cases is the 
upward trend: all media outlets surveyed increased the number of followers, users and likes 
during the six-month period. The highest increases are those of Xinhua’s and China Plus’s 
(CRI’s online brand) Facebook page: users doubled in six months. While there is a lot of 
endogamy among media houses in following each other on different social media platforms (i.e. 
BBC Africa follows the AFP Africa and Reuters in Africa accounts, and vice versa), Chinese 
news organizations are not part of the club. By the end of 2015, no big news media organization 
based in Africa or abroad followed Xinhua, CCTV-Africa or China Plus. Chinese media seem 
to lag behind their international counterparts in reputation among other media houses and in the 
overall number of followers, users and likes. In the case of Africa, BBC Africa surpasses by a 
large margin CCTV-Africa across platforms (by 261,387 followers on Twitter, 1,735,236 users 
on Facebook).x However, as latecomers online—CCTV-Africa has only been online since 
2012—the room for growth for Chinese news outlets online is large.  
 
Messages and themes 
As shown above, Xinhua, CCTV and CRI have an active presence on social networks, 
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter being the most commonly used. Some have specific versions 
for the African market, such as accounts in Swahili for East African audiences. The primary 
 uses of these platforms online are self-promotion and content distribution. Engagement with 
audiences is rare and so is using social media as feedback channels. According to a member of 
CCTV-Africa’s digital team, the station is primarily online ‘to promote CCTV-Africa.’xi The 
element of promotion features prominently in my analysis of Twitter messages. Between 
September 2015 and April 2016, CCTV-Africa tweeted 6,043 times, for an average of 28 tweets 
per day (the largest number of tweets in one day was 75 on September 25, when Xi Jinping 
visited the US and on January 29, during the 26th AU Summit). Of all tweets, 11.5 per cent were 
used to promote a specific story or topic on one of the station’s five programmes (Africa Live, 
Talk Africa, Faces of Africa, Match Point and Global Business) with cues such as ‘Coming up 
on #AfricaLive…’ or ‘Join us at 1700GMT...’ Open audience engagement online is absent. 
Over the period of eight months that I analysed, CCTV-Africa was mentioned in over 2,000 
tweets, but community managers engaged with users’ comments only 27 times. In all of the 
cases the engagement consisted in liking a positive comment about the work of CCTV-Africa’s 
journalists. There were no instances of engaging in dialogue, responding to questions or facing 
criticism. When asked about how this interaction was handled, a member of the digital team 
said: ‘sometimes we hide the complaints. But sometimes we let them stay there because they are 
funny and then we just laugh and then delete them.’xii 
 
In terms of content distribution, there are two approaches to examine what messages are 
circulated: the messenger’s perspective (i.e. what stories and topics are most often posted by 
CCTV-Africa?) and the audience perspective (i.e. what are the most popular topics and 
themes?). I will use data from Twitter in the first case and YouTube data in the second. With 
fewer than 30 messages a day on average, the digital team is rather selective in the topics on 
which it tweets. One way of making sense of the selection of stories is to look at the use of 
hashtags, which are keywords chosen by the author of a tweet to highlight the most relevant 
theme. I present a selection of the 30 most often-used hashtags by CCTV-Africa and their 
frequency in Table 3, out of a total of 880 hashtags used between September 2015 and April 
2016. Among the most frequent, the large majority refers to countries/regions (15 hashtags; 978 
 occurrences) followed by references to CCTV-Africa shows and other self-promotion keywords 
(7; 1,511). The remaining eight hashtags can be classified in two groups, those that refer to Xi 
Jinping (3; 345) and those that address a one-time event or topic (5; 173). Four specific African 
events, the 2015 elections in Tanzania, the 2015 Ebola outbreak, the 26th AU Summit and the 
2015 FOCAC meeting are on the list. If we take a look at the wider picture, of all 880 hashtags, 
the most frequently used are those referring to a geographical location, such as a country or a 
city (1,778 occurrences; 223 hashtags); followed by those used for self-promotion (1,618; 27), 
those referring to an event (612; 191) and those mentioning Xi Jinping (370; 12). Locations in 
Africa are the most frequent (89 per cent), while locations in China are rare (3.7). If we exclude 
locations and hashtags for self-promotion, the predominant themes are politics (856; 166), 
terrorism and security (175; 48), sports (159; 87) and social issues (107; 45). 
 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
There is some degree of correlation between Twitter data (messenger-centred) and YouTube 
data (audience-centred). For the latter, my analysis is based on the 500 videos with the highest 
number of views by the end of 2015. The sample includes videos uploaded between April 2013 
and December 2015. The total number of views for these 500 clips was 14,677,582 (M = 
29,355.16; SD = 242,816.92; Max = 5,343,431; Min = 3,613). The majority of videos (85.8 per 
cent) are short clips (less than five minutes) from CCTV-Africa’s current affairs programme, 
Africa Live, followed by longer clips (around 25 minutes) from the station’s documentary show, 
Faces of Africa (9.2 per cent). The clip with the highest number of views features exclusive 
CCTV-Africa footage from the terrorist attack at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 
November 2013. This is followed by a feature story of a 2-year old DJ in South Africa and a 
documentary about traditional healers in Nigeria. Generally speaking, viewership is higher for 
videos related to politics and diplomacy (15.6 per cent), economic matters and infrastructure 
(23.2) and security and terrorism (16.4). These are followed by videos about sports (9.6), social 
issues (6.4) and entertainment (6.8). In terms of the geographic distribution of videos, the 
 largest number is related to Ethiopia (18.2 per cent), followed by Somalia (15.6) and South 
Africa (11.4). There are only three videos in which China is the central actor. Videos about 
Sino-African relations, in which China is a secondary actor alongside an African country, are 
more common (35 videos; 7 per cent).  
 
When CCTV-Africa was launched, a lot of attention in the media and in academia was centred 
around the idea that the new channel was going to offer a new take on African current affairs 
and, particularly on Sino-African relations (Genet, 2012; Gagliardone, 2013). The first premise 
was that CCTV-Africa would focus on positive stories about the continent (McKenzie, 2012). 
However, online, as is the case offline (Zhang, 2013), the number of negative stories is almost 
the same as positive ones. Of the 500 YouTube stories analysed, 27.6 per cent are about 
negative issues such as war, famine or terrorism, while the number of positive videos stands at 
38 per cent. A second observation from the data above has to do with the relative prominence of 
Xi Jinping related messages in CCTV-Africa’s Twitter feed (7 per cent). Particularly striking is 
the fact that, although Xi visited several African countries during the period of analysis (Egypt, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa), the largest number of mentions are of his official visit to the UK 
and US. A third element that stands out in CCTV-Africa’s messages online is the considerable 
presence of retweets or RT (13 per cent), messages that are initially posted by one user and 
reposted by another. Among the users that CCTV-Africa has retweeted we find the BBC, 
Reuters or AFP, which are some of the media outlets whose narrative CCTV-Africa is supposed 
to challenge.  
 
Conclusion 
Even though China’s digital public diplomacy towards Africa is at a very early stage of 
development, it probably offers the most comprehensive case study of how China is adopting 
online tools to enhance its management of foreign publics. This chapter has shown that several 
actors, loosely coordinated, are involved in the implementation of public diplomacy goals 
 across Africa. At the forefront of these efforts are State-owned media and overseas diplomatic 
missions. These actors predominantly engage in unidirectional communication activities, 
particularly advocacy campaigns and international broadcasting. And, even though only one 
embassy in Africa is present on Facebook, the active use of social networking sites by other 
actors, such as CCTV, Xinhua and CRI, has opened new avenues for listening to audience 
feedback. However, evidence shows that this is done sparsely and that criticism is removed 
from online platforms, failing to engage in dialogue with dissenting voices. In terms of 
audiences, Chinese media in Africa—the only public diplomacy actors about which data is 
available—trail behind other international broadcasters such as the BBC. In the case of CCTV-
Africa, which I used as an example in this chapter, social media analytics are the only source of 
audience data available. Because of this, they are being used by managers to inform decisions 
on content and hiring practices. In terms of content, two central ideas emerge from the analysis. 
First, the use of Twitter at CCTV-Africa neither contributes to building a new Chinese narrative 
on Sino-African relations nor to engage audiences. Instead, it is primarily used for self-
promotion. Second, data from YouTube shows that topics and issues that are popular among 
audiences are not necessarily aligned with China’s public diplomacy goals. 
 
This chapter has provided evidence that China is beginning to embrace digital public 
diplomacy. However, there are several factors hampering its development and impact. First, 
China lacks a clear strategy in dealing with foreign audiences. In fact, it could be argued more 
generally that, as Christensen (2013) puts it, in foreign policy ‘China needs something akin to a 
grand strategy but currently lacks one’ (p. 23). This is also the case in China’s public diplomacy 
towards Africa. There are plenty of actors engaged, but they operate without a clear direction or 
goal. Second, China lacks coordination in the implementation of its policies. There is a gap 
between the objectives stated in policy documents and the actual implementation. In the case of 
CCTV-Africa, for example, although one of the main goals is to shape views on Sino-African 
relations, the reality is that little attention is paid to these specific issues online. Third, China 
lacks a clearly defined narrative that challenges existing ones. Fourth, China lacks depth in its 
 public diplomacy activities. The tendency in China’s go out policy has been to prioritize 
quantity (or breadth) over quality (or depth) of engagements. With too many activities running 
simultaneously, guaranteeing that the outcomes are those expected becomes a very difficult 
task. Fifth, China lacks the know-how and the human resources to fully implement its public 
diplomacy online. Teams are understaffed and the digital competence of those in charge of 
supervising digital diplomacy is limited. And, sixth, China lacks willingness to engage in 
dialogue online. Cull (2011) refers to this as the ‘broadcast mode.’ When describing US online 
public diplomacy, he cautions: ‘the fixation with “broadcast mode” in US online diplomacy is a 
major faux pas. It is the equivalent of going into a party and shouting about one’s self and 
leaving: a behaviour which is intolerable even if one is buying all the drinks, which the United 
States no longer is’ (p.15). China might be the one who is currently buying all the drinks, but 
the failure to take full advantage of the multidirectionality of online communications is 
hindering the effectiveness of its incipient digital diplomacy. 
 
China’s commitment to playing an active role in Africa in the future means that it can only be 
expected that Chinese online public diplomacy in the continent will grow. As both African 
audiences and Chinese public diplomacy practitioners move forward, two important questions 
on the future trajectory of the relationship emerge. As outlined above, new forms of public 
diplomacy favour dialogue and cooperation over unidirectional flows of communication. 
However, to date, offline and online, China has been reluctant to engage in any real form of 
dialogue beyond the diplomatic pleasantries of FOCAC meetings. The nature of the relationship 
is still today largely asymmetrical. China is not open to being a recipient of other countries’ 
public diplomacy and, in the long-term, this is prone to create resentment. How will China 
transition to a relationship of equal partners is the first open question. China’s distribution of 
information in Africa, and in the rest of the world, can only be an effective means of managing 
foreign attitudes if it is received as credible and reliable. In a context of information overload, it 
is difficult to predict which voices are going to stand out. China has decided to bet on 
saturation; making as much information available as possible with the hope that it will reach 
 audiences. But in the current cacophony of voices online, how successfully this strategy will 
enable China to increase its discursive power overseas is also a lingering question. 
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Table 1. Structure of China’s digital diplomacy towards Africa 
 
 Diplomatic Missions Central State-Owned Media Other Media Organizations State Agencies 
Listening Facebook page of the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria 
Swahili and Hausa Facebook 
Pages of CRI; YouTube 
accounts of CCTV-Africa and 




Speeches and diplomatic notes 
online; webpages about Tibet, 
Taiwan or Falun Gong; 
reposting content from 
website such as China.org.cn 
CCTV-Africa’s online content 
on CNTV; Xinhua’s 
commentary and Op-Ed; 
CRI’s multilingual online 
content 
Websites such as China-
Africa Cooperation Net 
(www.zfhz.org); online 
version of China Daily or 
Chinafrica 
Content creation for 
China.org.cn and similar 
websites under the auspices of 
the State Council 
Cultural 
diplomacy --- 
“I Love Africa” web portal; 
Chinese TV drama available 
on CNTV; CRI cultural shows 
--- --- 
Exchange 
diplomacy --- --- --- --- 
International 
broadcasting 
Reuse of video news and 
content from CCTV-News & 
CCTV-Africa 
Website and YouTube 
channel of CCTV-Africa, 
Xinhua & CRI in multiple 
languages 
Reuse of video news and 
content from CCTV-News & 
CCTV-Africa 
Reuse of video news and 
content from CCTV-News & 
CCTV-Africa; Facebook and 




Table 2. Number of ‘Likes’ and followers of selected international broadcasters on 
Facebook, YouTube and Twitter (October 2015 – March 2016) 
 







Facebook     
CCTV-Africa 01/2012 453,863 740,745 63,2 
BBC Africa 01/2010 2,060,356 2,475,981 20,2 
CCTV-America 08/2012 504,073 773,033 53,4 
CCTV-News 08/2013 15,866,874 21,672,148 36,6 
New China News (Xinhua) 01/2012 2,271,499 4,775,498 110,2 
China Plus (CRI) 03/2013 971,391 2,016,518 107,6 
BBC News 04/2010 24,409,119 28,505,778 16,8 
RT (Russia Today) 04/2012 3,032,196 3,401,171 12,2 
YouTube     
CCTV-Africa 04/2013 28,160 36,918 31,1 
BBC Africa -- -- -- -- 
CCTV-America 06/2012 12,868 19,050 48,0 
CCTV-News 01/2013 36,217 50,204 38,6 
New China TV (Xinhua) 05/2012 63,479 69,119 8,9 
China Plus (CRI) -- -- -- -- 
BBC News 04/2006 562,976 725,273 28,8 
RT (Russia Today) 03/2007 1,604,214 1,761,694 9,8 
Twitter     
CCTV-Africa 06/2012 32,291 43,204 33,8 
BBC Africa 09/2009 950,738 1,212,125 27,5 
CCTV-America 06/2012 43,711 63,955 46,3 
CCTV-News 01/2013 237,694 290,684 22,3 
New China News (Xinhua) 03/2012 2,897,009 3,830,473 32,2 
China Plus News (CRI) 04/2009 -- 2,235 -- 
BBC News (World) 02/2007 11,694,870 13,802,257 18,0 





Table 3. Most frequently used hashtags by CCTV-Africa on Twitter between September 
2015 and April 2016 
 
Hashtag Frequency Overall percentage (N = 5,165) 
#africalive 1,197 22.86% 
#xijinping 227 4.34% 
#africa 133 2.54% 
#kenya 113 2.16% 
#nigeria 105 2.01% 
#southafrica 86 1.64% 
#businessnews 78 1.49% 
#globalbusiness 75 1.43% 
#breaking 74 1.41% 
#burundi 73 1.39% 
#egypt 69 1.32% 
#uganda 65 1.24% 
#xiusavisit 62 1.18% 
#xiukvisit 56 1.07% 
#burkinafaso 49 0.94% 
#zimbabwe 49 0.94% 
#china 47 0.9% 
#somalia 45 0.86% 
#tanzaniadecides 45 0.86% 
#focac 38 0.73% 
#coted 36 0.69% 
#mali 36 0.69% 
#southsudan 36 0.69% 
#tanzania 36 0.69% 
#26thausummit 35 0.67% 
#matchpoint 31 0.59% 
#sportsnews 28 0.53% 
#talkafrica 28 0.53% 
#parisattacks 28 0.53% 
#ebola 27 0.52% 
 																																																								
i Some media analysts, such as Olesen (2015), have suggest that the fast growth in ‘Likes’ of the People’s 
Daily’s Facebook page can be explained by the use of click-farms, companies that provide large numbers 
of ‘Likes’ for a set price. 
ii Only in recent years have individuals and non-state actors begun to be minimally involved in the 
process of engaging foreign audiences. A good example of this, in the context of Africa, and particularly 
Kenya, is the NGO China House (Li, 2015). 
iii The video is available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHL-0N07rxo [Accessed: 14 July 
2016].  
iv For a more detailed description of China’s public diplomacy in Africa, see D’Hooghe (2015, pp.206–
219). 
v Interview #5, November 2015, Nairobi. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, thus they are only 
identified here with a number. 
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vi Interview #6, May 2015, Nairobi. 
vii Interview #1, September 2015, Nairobi. 
viii Interview #4, October 2015, Nairobi. 
ix Facebook only makes available data for the Top 45 countries and aggregates into one whole sum data 
for the rest of countries. 
x For YouTube, data is not available for BBC Africa. 
xi Interview #3, November 2015, Nairobi. 
xii Interview #2, November 2015, Nairobi. 
